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Abstract 
The present paper discusses the main features of repressed financial markets and the various 
subtle ways that repressed financial markets cause major distortions of capital flows among 
countries. Some of the key features of repressed financial markets include large fiscal deficits, 
high inflation, subsidized and directed credit lines, low savings rates, high bank reserve 
requirements, high transaction costs, and government controls of interest rates and exchange 
rates. Repressed financial markets may increase risk for agribusinesses by adversely affecting 
ownership opportunities and the ability to invest locally. The added risks also include exchange 
rate risk and interest rate risk. Agribusinesses may want to increase use of futures markets, 
contracting and integration to manage the increased risk. As the world moves to more open 
markets, countries with repression in financial markets may encounter difficulty attracting 
foreign investment and mobilizing local resources for economic growth. Reform of financial 
markets will likely be necessary to succeed in the new world order. 
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Introduction 
The central thesis of the present paper is that repressed financial markets lead to serious 
distortions of capital flows in financial markets. Repression in financial markets occurs because 
governments intervene in markets to attempt to benefit targeted groups and/or to correct 
problems of perceived "market failure". Because of repressed financial markets, financial 
resources are not allocated by the market system to their highest and best use. Some of the key 
features of repressed financial markets frequently include large fiscal deficits, high inflation, 
subsidized and directed credit lines, low savings rates, high bank reserve requirements, high 
transaction costs, and government controls of interest rates, exchange rates, and capital flows 
(Adams et al., 1984, Gonzalez-Vega, 1994, and Von Pischke, 1991). 
These distortions very likely will increase the financial risks for agribusinesses in countries with 
repressed financial markets. Repressed financial markets may adversely affect ownership and 
investment opportunities in a country. Agribusinesses may discover that the investments made 
in a particular country during a period of economic stability suddenly become uncompetitive and 
unprofitable during a later time period. Agribusinesses may have difficulty exporting their goods 
because over-valued exchange rates cause their goods to lose competitiveness on world markets 
while imports of competing goods become cheaper due to the over-valued exchange rate. 
Agribusinesses may encounter financing problems because of a financial market facing excess 
demand for funds from borrowers, credit rationing from lenders, high borrowing and lending 
costs and inefficient financial intermediaries. 
The topic is very timely in today's world of global markets and increased competitiveness. 
Countries all over the world are more outward looking today than in the past. Trade agreements 
such as The World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Union (EU), the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Andean countries' trade pact, the Central American 
Common Market (CACM) and the Southern Cone countries' trade agreement (MERCOSUR) ·are 
all examples of the increased emphasis upon open economies, trade and competitiveness. 
The authors are Professor and Professor and Chairperson, respectively, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. 
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Repressed financial markets are not uncommon in Central and South American countries as well 
as in other parts of the world. High inflation and other economic problems in Brazil, Mexico, 
Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua, Peru, and Uruguay, for example, have resulted in 
government intervention in financial markets (Table 1). These countries have recently reformed 
their macro-economic and financial market policy to achieve more open, competitive financial 
markets. 
The present paper discusses the main features of repression in financial markets, followed by 
an illustration for Mexico of the impacts of these distortions on business decisions and capital 
flows. 
Common Features of Repressed Financial Markets 
Common features of repressed financial markets frequently include relatively high inflation rates, 
pegged exchange rates, large fiscal deficits, interest rate ceilings credit rationing, and low 
savings rates (Table 2). Governments that have large fiscal deficits may resort to many financial 
market interventions such as high rates of growth of the money supply to finance the fiscal 
deficit through an inflation tax. An inflation rate that is higher than the inflation rates of major 
trading partners will eventually lead to an over-valued exchange rate in a repressed financial 
market. 
Exchange rates can become over-valued because of differential rates of inflation among countries 
and the structure of protection of a country. 2 Since all countries have experienced some 
inflation in recent years, a pegged exchange rate will become over-valued whenever the rate of 
inflation of a particular country is greater than that of its major trading partners. Domestic costs 
and prices will increase faster than the costs and prices of the foreign imported goods making 
the latter relatively less expensive. Protective trade polices such as import tariffs and quotas and 
export taxes and quotas also lead to an over-valued exchange rate by raising the domestic price 
of the protected good or lowering the price of the export good. 
On the one hand, the over-valued exchange rates act as an implicit tax on export sectors such 
as agribusinesses that are very important sources of foreign exchange in many developing 
countries (De la Barra et al., 1995). As a result exports tend to decline and a country earns less 
foreign currency as the exchange rate becomes increasingly over-valued. On the other hand, 
consumers of food and other imported products are subsidized indirectly because of the low 
prices for these items. Imports of the cheap goods tend to grow rapidly creating a serious 
foreign exchange problem as imports grow and exports decline (Larson and Vogel, 1983). The 
2 See Officer, 1976 for a discussion of these arguments and Balassa and Associates, 1971 
and Krueger, 1978 for a full discussion of effective protection and for estimates of 
effective protection for several countries. 
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over-valued exchange rate benefits importers and consumers and penalizes producers and 
exporters. World Bank studies in 1991 and 1992 found that the direct and indirect effects of 
taxation on agricultural prices (from 1960 to 1984 in 18 countries for 26 commodities) due to 
industrial protection policy and over-valued exchange rates was large in all regions (usually 
exceeding 20 percent). 
Countries with high inflation may resort to interest rate and price controls to attempt to reduce 
inflationary pressures. Interest rate ceilings (controls) may result in negative real interest rates 
(nominal interest rates adjusted for inflation) on loans and deposits because the nominal interest 
rate adjustment may lag the inflation rate. With negative real interest rates all investors find it 
extremely attractive to borrow as much money as possible because they can repay the loan in 
the future using a depreciated currency (Adams et al., 1984). The financial intermediaries 
cannot satisfy this unlimited demand for cheap funds so various forms of credit rationing 
emerge. High lender and borrower transaction costs and other rationing mechanisms are used 
to ration the limited funds among all the potential borrowers. In this repressed market, the 
largest, most powerful, and possibly the most qualified borrowers tend to be the ones who obtain 
most of the funds and, therefore, most of the subsidy gain from the cheap credit. To reduce this 
flow of cheap funds to the largest borrowers, the governments may resort to directed credit lines 
at subsidized interest rates to benefit selected low income borrowers such as small farmers. For 
a variety of reasons, particularly the fungibility of credit, these directed credit programs usually 
fail to accomplish their objectives. 
Interest rate ceilings on loans also mean indirectly that interest rates on deposits are controlled 
because banks will not pay attractive rates on deposits if lending rates are controlled. Low or 
negative real rates of interest on deposits provide no incentive for savers to hold financial assets. 
As a result the amount of deposits mobilized for lending is very low causing as gap between the 
amount of credit demanded and supplied. If interest rates are negative in real terms, savers in 
fact are taxed for holding deposits in the banking system. Savers indirectly subsidize the 
borrowers. 
A recent analysis of the impact of domestic and external resources on the economic growth of 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica for the 1971-1985 period found that 
domestic savings exert a much larger impact on economic growth than external resources 
(Caceres, 1995). The study concludes that mobilization of domestic resources, financial, real, 
and human, is the key to Central American development. 
Financial Repression and Capital Flows in Mexico 
The financial market of Mexico illustrates many features of financial repression coupled with 
large capital out-flows in the economic crises of 1994 and 1995. Mexico's financial market is 
changing dramatically as the government continues a process of reforming and modernizing the 
financial system to increase efficiency and competitiveness. The reforms include items such as 
de-regulating interest rates, privatizing government owned banks, eliminating selective and 
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subsidized credit, and other reforms of financial markets in the 1980s (Katz, 1995). The 
benefits of the recent reforms have not been fully realized because of the economic crisis of 
December 1994. 
Mexico has experienced inflation rates much higher than in the U.S., a major trading partner, 
from 1983 through 1995 (Figure 1). The higher inflation rates have led to a de-valuation of the 
peso relative to the dollar from 1983 to 1994, with large adjustments in 1987 and 1994 (Figure 
2). However, Mexico's "managed exchange rate" adjustments appear to lag the inflation rate 
differential causing the peso to become increasingly over-valued. As Mexican exports became 
less competitive on world markets, the trade balance changed from about a US$ 15 billion 
surplus in the early 1980s to a negative US$ 20 billion in 1992 and 1993 (Figure 3). A rapidly 
growing foreign investment capital flow in the early 1990s, especially portfolio investment in 
the Mexican stock market, helped to reduce the problems of a trade deficit (Figure 4). The 
portfolio capital inflow, however, changed dramatically in 1995 as result of the Mexican 
economic and political crisis and increasing U.S. interest rates (Gruben, 1996). It is noteworthy 
that foreign direct investment in plants and equipment continued to increase from 1983 through 
1995 in spite of the economic and political crises. 
Real interest rates (nominal bank lending rates adjusted for inflation) have fluctuated from levels 
as high as 20 to 25 percent in the mid 1980s to a negative 15 or 20 percent in 1987 and 1988 
and then increasing to about 11 percent in 1994 (Figure 5). 3 With nominal lending rates around 
40 percent in 1995 and inflation around 35 percent, the real lending rate has again fallen to low 
levels. Even at low real interest rates there appears to be a short term credit crunch because of 
the economic crisis and banking problems such as rapidly increasing past due loans (Torres, 
1996). 
Agribusinesses, as well as all businesses, may find it very challenging to conduct business 
operations in a competitive and sustainable way in a repressed financial market with rapidly 
changing conditions. Export opportunities may look very favorable during one period and look 
very unfavorable during another as the exchange rate becomes increasingly over-valued due to 
differential inflation rates among trading partners. Exporters and importers must seek ways to 
manage the exchange rate risk to survive in such a rapidly changing market. Some of the means 
to manage foreign exchange rate risk include hedging in futures market, contracting, and vertical 
integration. 
Participation in U.S. futures exchanges can be an effective means of risk management for non 
U.S. firms. In particular, off-shore international traders often face both commodity price and 
exchange rate risk. In situations like this, Thompson and Bond (1987) examined the optimal 
3 A widely used definition of real interest rates uses the formula r = 1 + i I 1 + p minus 
1 where r is the real interest rate, i is the nominal rate, and p the mean rate of inflation 
(Von Pischke, 1991). 
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level of participation in U.S. futures markets within the context of floating exchange rates. They 
found that the optimal hedge was highly sensitive to the degree of exchange rate instability. 
Agribusinesses may also find that availability and cost of funds can vary dramatically from one 
period to another. Domestic credit from the banking system may be difficult for agribusinesses 
to obtain as governments compete for limited funds with the private sector. Firms that rely 
primarily on internal capital may have an advantage in these conditions. As discussed above real 
interest rates on credit have fluctuated a great deal making it very attractive to borrow in pesos 
in one period and very expensive in another period. Firms that have the opportunity to borrow 
in various currencies may be able to have a lower cost of money than firms borrowing in only 
one currency. Agribusinesses may also be able to manage the interest rate risk through the use 
of interest rate futures contracts, self financing and vertical integration. 
Conclusions 
The absence of efficient financial markets causes capital flow distortions. Government directed 
credit lines at subsidized rates of interest often attempt to target credit to high priority areas such 
as small farmers or businesses that may not have the most productive use of funds. Because 
credit is subsidized an excess demand for credit develops. Negative or low real interest rates 
provide little incentive for savings mobilization causing a shortage of loanable funds in the 
banking system. Lenders must ration the limited funds among all the potential borrowers. 
Fixed exchange rates can quickly become over-valued in an inflationary economy. Over-valued 
exchange rates that tax export sectors and subsidize imports weaken the competitive position of 
agribusinesses on world markets. 
Capital is a very mobile resource and will flow to those countries, regions, and sectors where 
the highest return can be earned. Countries, regions and agribusiness firms are most interested 
in using their capital where the highest return can be earned. Agribusiness firms have many 
alternative countries and sectors in which to invest their funds. Agribusinesses may encounter 
increased risks when conducting business in countries with repressed financial markets. 
Agribusinesses may want to use futures markets, contracting and vertical integration as ways to 
manage the increased risk. Countries with repression in financial markets may have difficulty 
attracting foreign investment and mobilizing the local resources needed for economic growth. 
Reform of the financial markets may be necessary for the businesses and countries to succeed 
in the new world order. 
As the world moves to more open markets, agribusinesses will be able to produce and trade 
goods from most anywhere in the world. The choice of location will be heavily influenced by 
the expected business risks and the most efficient place for an activity. While goods are 
becoming more mobile, and labor to some extent, capital is the most mobile resource. Capital 
will readily flow into and/or out of countries as it seeks to earn the highest return possible. The 
success of the newly industrializing countries of the Pacific Rim, the "Asian Tigers", with their 
more open, competitive economies may be the most appropriate model for other countries that 
want to attract businesses and achieve faster economic growth (Krugman, 1994). 
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Table 1. Annual Inflation Rates in Selected Countries and Macroeconomic Policies Employed to Correct Inflation 
COUNTRY 
BRAZIL 
MEXICO 
BOLIVIA 
ARGENTINA 
CHILE 
NICARAGUA 
PERU 
URUGUAY 
INFLATION 
1981-85 1985-90 
160% 954% 
66 73 
2,200 27 
370 1,382 
21 20 
93 10,176 
108 2,467 
50 84 
--MACROECONOMIC POLICIES--
Cruzado plan - Monetary reform, brief wage and price 
freeze followed by administered prices. increase in 
interest rates, fiscal rebates introduced to stimulate 
exports and savings, suspended interest payments on 
foreign debt, devalued currency 
Fiscal and monetary policy, structural reforms aimed at 
liberalization, joined GATI in 1979, wage and price 
freeze followed by wage and price controls, reduced 
size of public sector, deregulation of prices, removal of 
price subsidies, secured more foreign credits 
Tight monetary policy, increased tax revenues, reduced 
employment in public corporations, devalued currency 
by 93 % , eliminated debt servicing, introduced value 
added tax (VAT), obtained external financing for 
investments, obtained structural adjustment loan from 
IMF, aimed at annual average price increase of less 
than 10% 
Austral plan - Price freeze followed by administered 
prices, increased interest rates, economic integration 
and cooperative agreement with Brazil in 1986, special 
export programs, obtained loan from IMF to pay 
external debt and reformed public sector by 
restructuring, staffing and adjusting price levels 
Export promotion, efficient import substitution, greater 
domestic savings, improved international payments 
position, reduced size of public sector and transferred 
enterprises to private sector, increased ceiling for 
foreign investment, reduced import tariffs 
Devaluation of official exchange rate (settlement of 
50 % of exports and cash grants at the official rate with 
the other 50% settled at the exchange agency rate), 
bank reserve requirements increased to channel 
resources to key productive activities, interest rates on 
lending and borrowing increased, taxes increased and 
wages ad justed 
Reduced production costs, reduced interest rates and tax 
burden of businesses and individuals, revived domestic 
output and demand with expansive monetary and fiscal 
policies, maintained overvalued exchange rate in order 
to make imported inputs less expensive, and exchange 
controls reinforced to ensure availability of foreign 
exchange for economic recovery 
Reduced public sector deficit with measures designed to 
control the rise in spending, periodic adjustments of 
rates and prices for public services, limited the money 
supply growth, wage adjustments with workers and 
employers every four months, monitored movements of 
international reserves and changes in exchange rate, 
negotiated new terms for servicing external public debt 
Sources: Date on inflation - CEPAL, Transformacion Producriva con Equidad and CEPAL. Preliminary Overview .. . 1990. 1991. Data for 1961-
1980 are from IDB, Economic and Social Progress in Larin America 1990 Report. Information on macro economic policies - IDB. 
Macroeconomic Policies - Economic and Social Progress in Larin America, 1987 Report. Table from De la Barra et al. p. 186. 
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Table 2. Common Features of Repressed Financial Markets Compared 
to Open, Competitive Financial Markets 
Repressed Financial Markets 
High Inflation 
Pegged/Over-valued Exchange Rates 
Large Fiscal Deficits 
Interest Rate Ceilings 
Negative Real Interest Rates 
Capital Outflows 
Subsidized Interest Rates with 
Directed Credit Lines 
Credit Rationing 
Low Savings Rates 
High Transaction Costs 
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Open. Competitive Financial Markets 
Low Inflation 
Floating Exchange Rate 
Small Fiscal Deficits 
Market Determined Interest Rates 
Positive Real Interest Rates 
Capital Inflows 
Market Interest Rates 
Market Allocation of Funds 
High Savings Rates 
Lower Transaction Costs 
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FIGURE 3: MEXICO'S TRADE BALANCE 
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